Epistemic Justice and Animal Voice

Sor Juana struggled against epistemic injustice—her knowledge and observations were dismissed because she was a woman, regardless of their merit. Contemporary animal ethics faces similar challenges: animal experiences and interests are systematically excluded from the knowledge systems and policy decisions that shape their lives. We make decisions about animal welfare, habitat, and use without centering animal perspectives. This is epistemic injustice. While animals cannot speak human language, they communicate through behavior, physiology, and ecological presence. We have methods to understand animal preferences: observing what they seek and avoid, studying their cognitive and emotional capacities, listening to indigenous knowledge traditions that center animal perspectives. The concept calls us to actively resist the dismissal of animal evidence and indigenous ecological knowledge. By treating animal experience as a legitimate epistemic source, we transform research, policy, and ethics. Sor Juana's demand to be heard and believed applies urgently to animals whose testimonies—written in behavior and biology—are too often silenced by human interests and institutional biases.