Epistemic Justice: Whose Knowledge Counts

Sor Juana battled epistemic injustice—her knowledge was dismissed because she was a woman, a nun, not a university-credentialed male scholar. Yet her observations and arguments were rigorous. This concept applies to animal knowledge systems: indigenous peoples possessed sophisticated understanding of animals and ecosystems developed over millennia, yet colonial systems dismissed this knowledge as primitive superstition. Similarly, scientific knowledge about animal cognition and emotion has been historically marginalized or ignored to protect exploitative industries. Epistemic justice in animal rights means recognizing multiple valid forms of knowing: scientific research on animal consciousness, indigenous ecological wisdom, the observational knowledge of those who live closely with animals. Sor Juana's insistence on her own intellectual authority suggests we must democratize knowledge—validate ways of understanding that dominant systems exclude. When we honor diverse knowledge about animals, when we listen to indigenous land management, when we take seriously scientific evidence of animal minds, we practice epistemic justice that grounds more comprehensive animal rights frameworks.