Epistemic Justice and the Right to Be Heard

Epistemic justice—coined by contemporary philosopher Miranda Fricker—addresses how power operates through whose knowledge is believed. Sor Juana faced epistemic injustice constantly: her intellectual contributions were attributed to male mentors, her theological insights questioned because she was a woman, her authority undermined by her status as colonial subject and nun. In intersectional practice, epistemic justice requires actively believing marginalized people's accounts of their own experiences and expertise. It means questioning the automatic credibility given to dominant groups and the skepticism directed at others. A woman describing workplace discrimination deserves belief; a person of color describing racism deserves belief; a disabled person describing accessibility needs deserves belief. Epistemic justice work includes examining whose knowledge we cite, whose expertise we compensate, whose voices we amplify. It means structural change: hiring diverse experts, diversifying curricula, crediting intellectual contributions accurately. Sor Juana's struggle for recognition demonstrates that epistemic justice is foundational to all other justice work—you cannot claim rights you are not believed to have.