Freedom as Capacity, Not Mere Absence of Constraint

Sor Juana was technically free—not enslaved, not imprisoned—yet her freedom was constrained by lack of access to education, institutional resources, and economic independence. This concept reframes libertarian justice: freedom is not merely the absence of prohibition but the presence of capacity to exercise choices. A person may be formally free to own property but lack money; free to publish but lack access to printing; free to learn but denied education. Libertarian justice must address this distinction. Sor Juana's struggle was not against explicit chains but against structural inability to exercise formal freedoms. This concept demands that libertarian theory move beyond negative liberty (freedom from interference) to include positive capacity (freedom to act). True property rights and freedom require material conditions: access to tools, education, networks, resources. Without these, rights are mere abstraction. Sor Juana's life demonstrates that libertarian justice requires not just removing barriers but creating conditions where freedom becomes materially realizable. Justice means both protecting property rights and ensuring the capacity to exercise them.