Knowledge Production and Epistemic Justice

Sor Juana's intellectual work occurred within rigid epistemological hierarchies: theological knowledge outranked natural philosophy, male scholars outweighed female thinkers, Spanish frameworks dominated indigenous knowledge. She challenged what counted as legitimate knowing and who was authorized to know it. This concept applies to animal ethics through the question: what forms of knowledge about animals do we recognize as valid? Scientific studies of animal consciousness may carry more weight in policy debates than direct observation by farmers or caretakers. Indigenous knowledge systems that long recognized animal personhood get dismissed as superstition. The concept demands epistemic justice: validating diverse ways of knowing animals—through scientific research, lived experience, cultural tradition, and cross-species attentiveness. Sor Juana's insistence that women and outsiders possessed valid intellectual authority suggests that animal advocates, activists, and those in daily relationship with animals hold legitimate epistemic standing. By expanding whose knowledge counts, we transform policy conversations. The question becomes not just 'What do animals need?' but 'Whose understanding of animal needs do we trust, and why?'